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Comment
ELLIS W . HAWLEY
L.ET ME BEGIN by Congratulating Mr. Soth on an interesting and
thoughtful paper detailing both the nature of the farm crisis and
Wallace's role in response to it. Wallace, I would agree, was a
major figure in changing the whole relationship between farm-
ing and government and between rural and urban society. I
would also agree that he was a complex mixture of ideologue
and pragmatist, as many New Dealers were; and I find little to
quarrel with in the paper's depiction of his background,
editorial positions, and actions in implementing and administer-
ing the agricultural New Deal. On all of these matters, it seems
to me essentially sound, accurate, trustworthy, and commend-
able.
What I have more difficulty with is the view, expressp'^ or
implied at several points in the paper, that Wallace's solutions
represented triumphs for economic democracy, social justice,
and agrarian ideals. In making such an assessment, it seems to
me, the paper tends to accept too uncritically Wallace's own
rhetoric and explanations, while tending to ignore those aspects
of the historical record to which contemporary critics and re-
cent reinterpreters of the New Deal have pointed. I would not
push matters as far as Lowell Dyson does in his recent book.
Red Harvest (1982), in which he depicts Wallace as a man "to
whom efficiency and hybrid corn were more important than
people." But there is something to be said, I think, for this rival
point of view—for the view, in other words, that Henry
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Wallace was really one of the great bureaucratizers and cor-
poratizers of American agriculture, a man who helped to devise
the machinery through which an agribusiness elite came to share
power with Big Business and Big Labor, rather than a fighter for
or implementer of democratic, egalitarian, or Jeffersonian
ideals. And it is to a consideration of this possibility that I want
to devote most of my remaining remarks.
One matter needing fuller appreciation is the extent to
which the reigning model for agricultural change during this
period was that of the modern corporation rather than the anti-
corporate citizens' action group. The central vision was of a
managerial and technical elite, a technostructure as it were,
developing for agriculture a creative balance between technical
progress and long-range stability. It was to do for agriculture
what a similar elite was believed to have done for the pro-
gressive sectors of American industry, borrowing where
necessary the government's power and resources. And like the
"new business," the result was to be not a new formation of
monopoly capital but the emergence of responsible self-
government, a new system consciousness, and an enhanced
capacity for social cooperation. In major respects such a solu-
tion was the very antithesis of that envisioned by populist
champions of agrarian democracy. It would turn farmers into
"organization men" rather than breaking corporate and finan-
cial power and thereby restoring their independence and
revitalizing their community life. And not surprisingly, it met
with strong criticism from those who saw the farm crisis as an
opportunity for implementing populist ideals.
Wallace, to be sure, was not always an avowed opponent
of these populist impulses. They did, after all, appeal to ideals
that he had earlier embraced; and like Roosevelt, he tried to
steer them into "constructive" channels or to use them in battles
against business opponents, flirting at times with monetary
reform schemes, antitrust programs, redistributive tax pro-
posals, or designs for creating independent yeomen. But such
flirtations tended to be temporary, unstable, and unproductive.
And as Soth's paper brings out, in the key clashes between the
heirs of populism and the builders of agribusiness mechanisms,
Wallace chose to side with the latter and support the ar-
rangements that they considered to be sound, practical, and
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American. He chose domestic allotment over the kind of market
intervention expressly designed to protect family farms or
landless tenants. He shared power with county agents, farm
bureaus, and committees of local notables, not with anti-
establishment groups imbued with populist ideals. He was one
of the purgers rather than a purgée in 1935. And while he sought
parity in the relationship between agriculture and urban in-
dustry, he did relatively little that would reduce extremes of in-
come among those engaged in agricultural pursuits.
In defense of such choices, Wallace sometimes argued that
real alternatives had not existed. Farmers had to become
organization men if they were to survive at all in a world of in-
creasingly complex and powerful organizations. Established
power had to be accommodated if anything at all was to be ac-
complished. And practical men had to do what they could
within existing constraints. This is also the line of defense
adopted in the paper, the line that allows it to depict Wallace
both as a promoter of modern business organization for the
agricultural sector and as a man driven by the ideals of social
justice and democratic citizenship. But the validity of such a
defense is not something that Wallace's populist-minded critics
accepted at the time or something that all historians of the
period would accept today. There was, so these dissenters
would argue, an alternative route that the agricultural New
Deal might have taken, one that would have used the state to
foster agrarian democracy and liberate truly oppressed rural
groups rather than lending its power to those intent upon mak-
ing agriculture more business-like. And the rejection of this
route they would see only partly as pragmatism operating
within an arena constrained by the realities of political and
social power. It was also due, they would insist, to the New
Dealers' own set of "ideological blinders," their notions in par-
ticular of organizational, technological, and market im-
peratives, which kept them from seeing the potentialities and
ultimate viability of such a route.
In the view of such dissenters, moreover, the struggle to
shape the agricultural New Deal was not really between those
with farming experience or backgrounds and those having
neither of these and hence no basis for making sound
judgments. The latter characterization might apply to the young
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lawyers of Jerome Frank's AAA legal division. But it was hardly
true of those involved in the Farm Holiday protests and
movements, the southern tenant farmer rebellions, the anti-
establishment activism of the Farmers Union, and various other
expressions of agrarian radicalism or populist revival. Many of
these people clearly had farming experiences and backgrounds,
although of the sort that gave them a quite different outlook on
what kind of agricultural New Deal was needed and what could
be accomplished by working with and through established
power structures.
Some interpreters, then, both contemporaries and subse-
quent students of the period's history, have had difficulty in see-
ing the new political economy of agriculture that Wallace
helped to create as bringing clear gains for economic
democracy, social justice, or agrarian ideals. Some, myself in-
cluded, would also be less inclined than Mr. Soth's paper is to
celebrate the results as one of our great national success stories.
It is true, to be sure, that using governmental power and
resources to bring modern business methods to the agricultural
sector has moved us toward the goal of parity for
agriculturalists, both in terms of a price index and in terms of in-
come, living standards, and bargaining power. Farming, as Mr.
Soth says, was turned into a first-class occupation rather than a
second-class one; and American agribusiness, generally speak-
ing, emerged as one of our industrial "winners" noted for its
productivity, efficiency, progressiveness, and capacity to
penetrate foreign markets. Market intervention here, over the
long haul, seems to have produced not the "lemon socialism" or
"protected backwardness and inefficiency" that free-market
theorists keep warning us against, but rather the kind of results
that current advocates of an "industrial policy" or a
"developmental state" envision as being the outcome of their ef-
forts.
But, as Mr. Soth also notes, producing such a "winner" has
reduced the nation's farm population from nearly a third of the
total to less than 3 percent of it. It has required institutional
machinery ever more difficult to reconcile with our professed
commitments to democratic goals and processes. And the other
side of providing first-class positions for our remaining farmers
has been a massive displacement of former agriculturists to
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second-class occupations in urban ghettos or rural backwaters.
All this, too, has been part of the transformation of America's
agricultural sector that Henry Wallace helped to set in motion in
the 1920s and 1930s. When one takes this side of the change into
account, the case for a national success story appears a good
deal weaker.
What I would have welcomed in the paper, then, is
somewhat less celebration of Wallace's achievements and
somewhat more recognition of how they departed from
agrarian ideals, how the choices producing them have been seen
by less friendly interpreters, and how they involved social losses
as well as benefits. Beyond this, I would also have welcomed
some footnotes that would enable a reader to determine which
sources were being drawn upon for particular points and
statements. But on balance, as I said at the beginning, I found
the paper interesting, thoughtful, well-informed, and helpful to
anyone seeking to understand the role of Wallace and the inter-
war farm crisis in the making of our current agricultural system.
It stands, in my judgment anyway, as another solid contribu-
tion toward achieving the ends for which this conference was
convened.
.219

